Nursing homes' competition and distributional implications when the market is two-sided / David Bardey, Luigi Siciliani.
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TextLanguage: English Series: Documentos CEDE ; 37Publisher: Bogotá : Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2018Description: 36 páginas ; 28 cmContent type: texto Media type: sin mediación Carrier type: volumenISSN: 1657-5334Subject(s): Accesibilidad a los servicios de salud -- Aspectos económicos | Competencia económica -- Investigaciones | Servicios de Salud -- Aspectos económicos | Ancianos -- InvestigacionesDDC classification: 362.16 Online resources: Consulta en línea Abstract: We investigate the effect of competition in the nursing homes sector with a two-sided market approach. More precisely, we investigate the distributional implications across the three key actors involved (residents, nurses and nursing homes) that arise from the two-sidedness of the market. Within a Hotelling set up, nursing homes compete for residents and for nurses, who provide quality to residents, by setting residents price and nurses wage. Nurses are assumed altruistic and therefore motivated to provide quality. The market is two-sided because: i) a higher number of residents affects nurses workload, which affects their willingness to provide labour supply; and ii) a higher number of nurses affects residents quality through a better matching process and by relaxing nurses time constraints.
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We investigate the effect of competition in the nursing homes sector with a two-sided market approach. More precisely, we investigate the distributional implications across the three key actors involved (residents, nurses and nursing homes) that arise from the two-sidedness of the market. Within a Hotelling set up, nursing homes compete for residents and for nurses, who provide quality to residents, by setting residents price and nurses wage. Nurses are assumed altruistic and therefore motivated to provide quality. The market is two-sided because: i) a higher number of residents affects nurses workload, which affects their willingness to provide labour supply; and ii) a higher number of nurses affects residents quality through a better matching process and by relaxing nurses time constraints.
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