The hidden face of justice : fairness, discrimination and distribution in transitional justice processes = La cara oculta de la justicia : justicia, discriminación y distribución en los procesos de justicia transicional / Juan Camilo Cárdenas, Andrés Casas Casas, Nathalie Méndez Méndez.
Material type:
TextLanguage: English Series: Documentos CEDE ; 40 Septiembre 2013Publisher: Bogotá : Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2013Description: 30 páginas : gráficas ; 28 cmContent type: texto Media type: sin mediación Carrier type: volumenISBN: 16575334ISSN: 1657-5334Other title: La cara oculta de la justicia : justicia, discriminación y distribución en los procesos de justicia transicionalSubject(s): Procedimientos judiciales -- Aspectos económicos | Justicia Distributiva | Victimas de Delitos -- Aspectos económicos | Justicia transicional | Colombia -- Política y gobierno -- Crítica e interpretaciónDDC classification: 303.69 Online resources: Consulta en línea Abstract: This article contributes to the literature on the impact of transitional justice measures using microfoundational evidence from experiments. We argue that there is a distributional dilemma at the heart of transitional justice programs, given that the State must allocate goods and services both to victims and ex\combatants. Individual and social preferences over these processes matter, given that they are likely to scale up to undermine or increase public support for transitional justice programs. We offer evidence from the Colombian case, to show what we call the hidden face of justice effect, which occurs when in the transition from war to peace distributional dilemmas arise and generate a social sanction function that creates negative incentives that can affect the achievement of reintegration of ex\combatants and jeopardizes the maintenance of peace. In order to explore the microfoundations that underlie the differences between allocations to victims and ex\combatants, we use a database built by Cárdenas et. al (2008) and find that ex\combatants expect lower transfers from public officers and indeed receive lower transfers, if compared to the victims and the control groups included in the study, despite the fact that third\party observers have the power to punish senders when making offers seen by the third\party as unfair.Abstract: Este artículo busca contribuir a la literatura sobre el impacto de las medidas de justicia transicional desde la perspectiva de los microfundamentos. A través del análisis de los resultados de juegos experimentales se establece la presencia de un dilema distributivo que al parecer está a la base de los mecanismos de justicia transicional cuando el estado debe destinar recursos, bines y servicios tanto a las víctimas como a los excombatientes.
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Incluye referencias bibliográficas.
This article contributes to the literature on the impact of transitional justice measures using microfoundational evidence from experiments. We argue that there is a distributional dilemma at the heart of transitional justice programs, given that the State must allocate goods and services both to victims and ex\combatants. Individual and social preferences over these processes matter, given that they are likely to scale up to undermine or increase public support for transitional justice programs. We offer evidence from the Colombian case, to show what we call the hidden face of justice effect, which occurs when in the transition from war to peace distributional dilemmas arise and generate a social sanction function that creates negative incentives that can affect the achievement of reintegration of ex\combatants and jeopardizes the maintenance of peace. In order to explore the microfoundations that underlie the differences between allocations to victims and ex\combatants, we use a database built by Cárdenas et. al (2008) and find that ex\combatants expect lower transfers from public officers and indeed receive lower transfers, if compared to the victims and the control groups included in the study, despite the fact that third\party observers have the power to punish senders when making offers seen by the third\party as unfair.
Este artículo busca contribuir a la literatura sobre el impacto de las medidas de justicia transicional desde la perspectiva de los microfundamentos. A través del análisis de los resultados de juegos experimentales se establece la presencia de un dilema distributivo que al parecer está a la base de los mecanismos de justicia transicional cuando el estado debe destinar recursos, bines y servicios tanto a las víctimas como a los excombatientes.
Resumen en Inglés y Español.
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